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Paul Elbourne
Queen Mary, University of London
There are four phenomena that are particularly troublesome for theories
of ellipsis: the existence of sloppy readings when the relevant pronouns
cannot possibly be bound; an ellipsis being resolved in such a way that
an ellipsis site in the antecedent is not understood in the way it was
there; an ellipsis site drawing material from two or more separate an-
tecedents; and ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent. These cases are
accounted for by means of a new theory that involves copying syntacti-
cally incomplete antecedent material and an analysis of silent VPs and
NPs that makes them into higher order deﬁnite descriptions that can be
bound into.
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1 Introduction
There is a common view of ellipsis according to which an elided phrase1 re-
quires a linguistic antecedent (Hankamer and Sag 1976) and the relationship
between elided phrase and antecedent is one of identity of Logical Form (LF)
or meaning (Sag 1976, Williams 1977).
Hankamer and Sag (1976) argued that ellipsis had to have a linguistic an-
tecedent on that basis of examples like these:
∗Previous versions of this work were presented in talks at NYU and CUNY in Fall 2004 and
at the University of Potsdam in Spring 2005. I am grateful to the audiences on those occasions
for their comments, especially to Sigrid Beck, Dianne Bradley, Robert Fiengo, Katja Jasin-
skaja, Elke Kasimir, Stephen Neale, Uli Sauerland, Peter Staudacher, Anna Szabolcsi and Eytan
Zweig. Naturally all errors are my own. This research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft as part of Sonderforschungsbereich 632 (Information Structure).
1I use the term elided phrase simply as a descriptive term, without wishing to advocate the
view on which such phrases are underlyingly present and deleted in the phonology. The same
goes, later, for my use of the term NP-deletion.
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(1) (Hankamer attempts to stuff a 9-inch ball through a 6-inch hoop.)
Sag: It’s not clear that you’ll be able to.
(2) (Sag produces a cleaver and makes as if to hack off his left hand.)
Hankamer: Don’t be alarmed. He never actually does.
We are supposed to imagine these examples being acted out, as it were, so that
thereisnolinguisticantecedentfortheellipsisineachcase,onlyanaccompany-
ing action. Hankamer and Sag claim that (1) cannot felicitously be understood
as “It’s not clear that you’ll be able to push that ball through that hoop,” even
though it is obvious what action is being referred to. An analogous claim is
made for (2). Hence the requirement for linguistic antecedents.
Ellipsis is thought to be based on the meaning or LF of the antecedent phrase
because of cases like the following, which is taken from Heim and Kratzer
1998. In (3), the elided VP can only be understood in the same way as the
scopally ambiguous antecedent VP. That is, if we understand the antecedent
with a drawing scoping above every teacher, we have to understand the elided
VP this way too; and analogously for the other scopal construal.
(3) Laura showed a drawing to every teacher, but Lena didn’t.
If the resolution of ellipsis makes reference directly to the meaning of the an-
tecedent and requires us to understand the same meaning at the ellipsis site, it
is obvious that we can achieve this result. We can also achieve this result by
supposing that ellipsis resolution makes reference to the syntactic level of LF,
where the quantiﬁers will have moved to positions that reﬂect their scopal order-
ing in the semantics (May 1977, 1985). For example, we might have something
like (4) as an LF representation of (3).
(4) Laura T [VP a drawing1 [VP every teacher2 [VP show t1 to t2]]]
Lena did not [VP a drawing1 [VP every teacher2 [VP show t1 to t2]]]
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LF into the ellipsis site, or of optionally not pronouncing a piece of syntactic
structure when its LF is identical to that of some antecedent.
This view is commonly linked to an account of strict and sloppy readings
that sees them as deriving from the pronouns in the antecedent being referen-
tial and bound respectively. The strict and sloppy readings of a representative
example are given in (5) (Ross 1967).
(5) a. John loves his mother and Bill does too.
b. ‘...Bill loves Bill’s mother.’ (Sloppy)
c. ‘...Bill loves John’s mother.’ (Strict)
If the pronouns in the VPs are ambiguous between referential and bound, we
have a neat account of this ambiguity (Keenan 1971). We can suppose that the
sloppy reading results from the pronoun being bound, as in (6), and the strict
reading results from the pronoun being referential, as in (7), where it is to be
understood that the sentence is interpreted with respect to a variable assignment
that maps 1 to John.
(6) Sloppy
John [λ2 t2 love his2 mother] and Bill [λ2 t2 love his2 mother]
(7) Strict
John [λ2 t2 loves his1 mother] and Bill [λ2 t2 love his1 mother]
Again, reference to either the meaning or the LF of the antecedent would sufﬁce
for the correct interpretation to be obtained at the ellipsis site.
The view that the strict-sloppy ambiguity is to be dealt with in terms of ref-
erential versus bound pronouns is independent in principle of the theses that
ellipsis requires a linguistic antecedent and that the relationship between an-
tecedent and elided phrase is one of identity of meaning or LF; but in practise
these three theories are often combined. I will call the composite view that as-
sumes all three the common view.66 Paul Elbourne
It has been known for some time that the common view is at best only par-
tially enlightening and that it may very well be utterly false. There are four
phenomena that seem to be incompatible with it.
The ﬁrst phenomenon is that of sloppy readings appearing when they cannot
possibly be the result of pronouns in VPs being bound. Some examples, with
sources, follow:
(8) The policeman who arrested John read him his rights, but the policeman
who arrested Bill didn’t. (Wescoat 1989)
(9) John’s coach thinks he has a chance, and Bill’s coach does too. (Rooth
1992)
(10) If John has trouble at school, I’ll help him, but if Bill does, I won’t.
(Hardt 1999)
(11) (John and Bill both have cats.) When I met John, I talked to his cat, but
when I met Bill, I didn’t.
Take (8), for example. It clearly has a reading, “...butthepoliceman who ar-
rested Bill didn’t read Bill his rights.” But this cannot be the result of the pro-
nouns in the antecedent VP being bound. If they were bound, the antecedent
would have the denotation [λx.x read xx ’s rights]. If one understands this af-
ter the subject of the second sentence, one obtains the meaning “The policeman
who arrested Bill didn’t read himself his own rights.” This is clearly not the
meaning that the sentence in fact has. Analogous considerations hold for sen-
tences (9)–(11). Some though not all speakers obtain a reading for (9) that can
be paraphrased “John’s coach thinks John has a chance and Bill’s coach thinks
Bill has a chance.” If I say (10), I say that if Bill has trouble at school I will
not help him, Bill; and if I say (11) I say that when I met Bill I did not talk to
his, Bill’s, cat. None of these examples can be accounted for by the theory that
sees sloppy readings of pronouns as arising from VP-internal pronouns being
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relevant pronoun in the antecedent VP does not c-command it. In the sentences
above, for example, John cannot c-command the pronouns him, his or he in the
ﬁrst conjunct. I will call readings like these binderless sloppy readings.
The second phenomenon that seems incompatible with the common view
arises in connection with sentences like the following:
(12) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to. When he had to clean, he
didn’t either. (Hardt 1999, Schwarz 2000)
This example clearly has a reading “When John had to cook, he did not want
to cook, and when he had to clean, he did not want to clean.” How it arrives
at this reading is entirely mysterious on the common view. The ellipsis in the
ﬁrst sentence seems straightforward enough. We take cook to be the antecedent,
and resolve the ellipsis so as to produce a meaning “When John had to cook, he
did not want to cook.” The VP of the matrix clause in the ﬁrst sentence will be
[VP want to cook]; or if the ellipsis is not resolved in the syntax but at some level
of semantic representation, there must be a VP denotation something like [λx.x
wants to cook]. This VP is the only plausible antecedent for the ellipsis in the
matrix clause of the second sentence. But any resolution procedure reliant on
identity of meaning or LF structure then predicts that the second sentence will
have to mean “When John had to clean, he did not want to cook.” This is not
the case, however. Thus the common view faces another signiﬁcant problem. I
will call examples like these examples of ellipsis-containing antecedents.
Note that the problem of ellipsis-containing antecedents arises in other con-
ﬁgurations than that just given, where the antecedent for VP-ellipsis contained
VP-ellipsis. The following examples involve NP-deletion:
(13) Every police ofﬁcer who arrested some murderers insulted some, and
everypoliceofﬁcerwhoarrestedsomeburglarsdidtoo.(Elbourne2001)
(14) After the books went on sale, thirteen shoppers who had bought some
earlier complained; but after the magazines went on sale, only two did.68 Paul Elbourne
(Eytan Zweig, personal communication)
(15) When John wanted to cook, he met some people who didn’t want him
to; and when he wanted to clean he met some too.
(13), on one natural reading, means “Every police ofﬁcer who arrested some
murderers insulted some murderers and every police ofﬁcer who arrested some
burglars insulted some burglars.”2 There is NP-deletion in the ﬁrst conjunct:
insulted some is understood as “insulted some murderers.” We then have VP-
ellipsis in the second conjunct: did too intuitively takes insulted some as its
antecedent; but instead of being understood as “insulted some murderers,” it is
understood as “insulted some burglars.” An exactly analogous problem arises
in connection with (14), which means “After the books went on sale, thirteen
shoppers who had bought some books earlier complained; but after the maga-
zines went on sale, only two shoppers who had bought some magazines earlier
complained.” So the problem arises also when the antecedent of NP-deletion
contains NP-deletion. The fourth logical possibility is VP-ellipsis within the
antecedent of NP-deletion, and we see this in (15). On one reading, this means
“When John wanted to cook, he met some people who didn’t want him to cook;
and when he wanted to clean he met some people who didn’t want him to
clean.” Again, there is no obvious way in which the common view, which posits
straightforward identity of meaning or LF structure between antecedent and el-
lipsis, can account for these examples.
The third problem that faces the common view arises when an ellipsis site
seems to be related to more than one antecedent, and to draw material from
both. Some well-known examples are the following:
(16) BobwantstosailroundtheworldandAlicewantstoclimbKilimanjaro,
but neither of them can, because money is too tight. (Webber 1978)
2There is possibly an ambiguity between “insulted some of the murderers he arrested” and
“insulted some other murderers.” This is not relevant here. See Elbourne 2001 for further dis-
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(17) I did everything Mary did. Mary swam the English Channel and Mary
climbed Kilimanjaro, and I did too. (Fiengo and May 1994)
(18) Whenever Max uses the fax or Oscar uses the Xerox, I can’t. (Fiengo
and May 1994)
The interpretations of these examples are tricky. (17) is the easiest. It pretty
clearly means “...and I swam the English Channel and climbed Kilimanjaro
too.” One wants to paraphrase (18) “Whenever Max uses the fax or Oscar uses
the Xerox I cannot use the fax or the Xerox,” but attention must be paid that
we do not analyze the sentence as meaning “...Icannot do either.” The correct
interpretation seems to be something like “...I cannot use whichever one is
being used.” Similarly, the ellipsis in (16) cannot be resolved “...neither of
them can do either,” but must mean something like “neither of them can do the
thing they want.” These facts are clearly beyond the ability of the common view
to capture. There are similar cases that involve NP-deletion, as pointed out in
Elbourne 2001:
(19) John needs a hammer. Mary needs a mallet. They’re going to borrow
Bill’s.
This seems to mean “They’re going to borrow Bill’s hammer and mallet.” I will
refer to examples like these as involving split antecedents.
The fourth problem for the common view is that some cases of VP-ellipsis
and NP-deletion require no linguistic antecedents whatsoever. Many people ﬁnd
the original examples of Hankamer and Sag (1976), repeated here, quite felici-
tous:
(20) (Hankamer attempts to stuff a 9-inch ball through a 6-inch hoop.)
Sag: It’s not clear that you’ll be able to.
(21) (Sag produces a cleaver and makes as if to hack off his left hand.)
Hankamer: Don’t be alarmed. He never actually does.70 Paul Elbourne
And there are many examples about which there is no debate whatsoever. The
followinglistofVP-ellipsiscasesisadaptedfromMerchantforthcoming,which
should be consulted for original references:
(22) (John attempts to kiss Mary while driving.)
John, you mustn’t.
(23) (A piece of chocolate cake is offered.)
I really shouldn’t.
(24) (As an invitation to dance.)
Shall we?
(25) (Mary gets John an expensive present.)
Mary, you shouldn’t have!
(26) (Gesturing towards an empty chair.)
May I?
(27) (Responding to the last.)
Please do.
(28) (Seeing someone about to do a shot of Tequila.)
If you can, I can too.
(29) (Looking at someone psyching herself up to jump across a wide gap.)
I bet she won’t.
(30) (Seeing someone who has just died his hair green.)
You didn’t!
(31) (Sitting next to someone doing something annoying.)
Must you?
(32) (On witnessing someone about to do anything undesirable.)
Don’t!
Once again there are analogous cases of NP-deletion:The Semantics of Ellipsis 71
(33) (There are lots of barking dogs in the yard. We look at them without
speaking. I point and say:)
Harry’s is particularly noisy. (Elbourne 2001)
I will call this phenomenon ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent.
We have four problems, then, that the common view does not seem able to
deal with, those of binderless sloppy readings, ellipsis-containing antecedents,
split antecedents and ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent. In this article I lay
out a theory of ellipsis that is compatible with all these data (section 2). I com-
ment on relevant previous literature in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
It should be emphasized that I will be concentrating entirely on the seman-
tics of ellipsis, without paying attention to any syntactic constraints there may
be on when ellipsis is possible. (See Johnson 2001 for a good overview of syn-
tacticandsemanticissuesconnectedwithVP-ellipsis.)AndIwillbeconcentrat-
ing on VP-ellipsis and NP-deletion, without attempting to account for sluicing,
pseudo-gapping and other kinds of ellipsis.
2 A Theory of Ellipsis
2.1 The Framework
2.1.1 Event Semantics and Little v
Following much work in event semantics and argument structure, I assume that
VPs are predicates of events (Davidson 1967, Parsons 1990, Tenny and Puste-
jovsky 2000, Pylkk¨ anen 2002), and that subjects are introduced by a special
head v that takes the VP as its sister (Kratzer 1996, Pylkk¨ anen 2002).
To give a ﬂavor of the general approach, let us take the example in (34),
which will have the structure in (35). The lambda-abstractor in the syntax is
from Heim and Kratzer 1998.
(34) Brutus stabbed Caesar.72 Paul Elbourne
(35) [TP Brutus [λ2 [Tpast [vP t2 [v [VP stab Caesar]]]]]]
The following lexical entries will enable vPs and VPs to be predicates of events,
with the whole sentence an assertion of the existence of certain kinds of time
intervals and events.3
(36) [[Tpast]] = λp s,t .∃t(t<NOW & at t : ∃ep(e)=1 )
[[v]] = λp s,t .λy.λe.p(e)=1&Agent(e,y)
[[stab]] = λz.λe.stabbing(e)&Theme(e,z)
These lexical entries give the meanings displayed in Figure 1 for different parts
of the tree. The sentence is interpreted with respect to a variable assignment g.
Figure 1 is not necessarily a serious contender for what the syntax and seman-
tics of this sentence actually look like. But it will be useful to have something
concrete to work with.
2.1.2 Pronouns and Names
I will follow Postal (1966), Stockwell, Schachter and Partee (1973), Abney
(1987), Longobardi (1994), Uriagereka (1995), Elbourne (2001, forthcoming)
and Neale (2005) in assuming that pronouns are basically determiners. In par-
ticular, third person pronouns are deﬁnite articles whose complements must be
phonologically null (Elbourne 2001, forthcoming); these complements can be
referential indices, which I take to be of type  e,t , or they can be normal NPs
unpronounced because of NP-deletion. For example, the index 2 in what we
would normally write as he2 might be interpreted, by means of a variable as-
signment mapping 2 to John, as [λx.x = John]; since he has the same meaning
3Some head should presumably convert the denotation of the whole sentence into a set of
possible worlds or situations, and there might also be heads that contribute illocutionary force.
I omit all these for simplicity’s sake and write as if the denotations of sentences were truth
values. I also do not properly take account of the indexical nature of tense, which presumably
must make reference to the time of utterance. I gesture towards this with the term NOW in the
metalanguage, which is supposed to be an indexical taking as its value the time of utterance on
each occasion of use.The Semantics of Ellipsis 73
TP, ∃t(t<NOW & at t : ∃e(stabbing(e)
& Theme(e,Caesar)&Agent(e,Brutus)))
Brutus λx.∃t(t<NOW & at t : ∃e(stabbing(e)
& Theme(e,Caesar)&Agent(e,x)))









Figure 1: Brutus stabbed Caesar
as the (give or take φ-features), the interpretation of pronoun plus index in this
case will be “the unique x such that x is identical to John,” or, in other words,
“John.” This position has the advantage of unifying the referential and bound
occurrences of pronouns with their use as donkey anaphors (Elbourne forth-
coming), assuming a theory whereby donkey pronouns are analyzed as deﬁnite
descriptions (Cooper 1979, Neale 1990, Heim 1990, Elbourne 2001, forthcom-
ing).
I will follow Burge (1973), Recanati (1993), Larson and Segal (1995) and74 Paul Elbourne
Elbourne (forthcoming) in assuming that names are basically nouns. We often
see them occurring with overt determiners, as in (37).
(37) a. An embattled Tony Blair addressed the Commons this afternoon.
b. Which Alfred did you mean? This Alfred?
When they appear to stand alone, they will be preceded by a special phono-
logically null deﬁnite determiner THE. This is paralleled by those languages
like Classical Greek and some dialects of German in which names are regularly
preceded by an overt deﬁnite article.
As for the semantics of names on this view, Burge’s (1973) basic idea is that,
for example, Alfred means something like “entity called Alfred,” and variants of
this have been proposed by the other authors just cited. In Elbourne forthcoming
I propose that on most occasions of use Alfred will mean “entity called Alfred
and identical to a,” where a is an individual constant picking out a particular
entity called Alfred. In this article I will just assume things like [λx.x is an
Alfred] for the meaning of names, since their exact semantics is orthogonal to
the issues of primary concern.
I will just assume that nouns are of type  e,t , and that deﬁnite articles,
including pronouns, are functions from predicates of type  e,t  to individuals
(Heim 1991, Heim and Kratzer 1998, von Fintel 2004, Elbourne 2005, forth-
coming), as proposed originally by Frege (1893). The semantics for some rele-
vant lexical items is shown in (38).4
(38) [[the]] g,h = λf e,t .ιxf(x)=1
[[him]] g,h = λf e,t .ιxf(x)=1
4The semantics given in (38) is a simpliﬁcation in that we probably need to embed the
whole lexical entry in a situation semantics or possible worlds semantics for full adequacy, and
have deﬁnite articles be functions from properties to individual concepts, i.e. functions from
circumstances of evaluation to individuals, as in Elbourne 2005, forthcoming. I overlook this
complication here and continue to operate with an extensional semantics. I also overlook the
φ-features on the pronouns, for the sake of simplicity.The Semantics of Ellipsis 75
[[cat]] g,h = λx.x is a cat
[[Alfred]] g,h = λx.x is an Alfred
The semantics of the metalanguage operator ι is as follows: for any function
f, the denotation of ιxf(x)=1  will be of type e, if it is deﬁned; if there
is exactly one entity x such f(x)=1 , the denotation of ιxf(x)=1  will
be that very individual; if there is no such individual, the whole expression
will have no value. (So the expression in effect introduces a presupposition that
there is exactly one such individual, since an utterance containing it will not
be felicitous otherwise.) The individual that is the value of the expression will
naturally vary from model to model. For example, if our universe is {2,3,4},
then the denotation of ιxx > 3 is 4; if the universe is {2,3,5}, the value
of the same expression will be 5. This, simply put, is how deﬁnite descriptions
differ from constants.
2.1.3 Ellipsis
In this section I will sketch a theory of ellipsis that will enable us to give a
straightforward account of the sentences involving ellipsis-containing anteced-
ents and binderless sloppy readings, and I will apply it to some relatively simple
data. In the next sections I will use to analyze the problematic data that we saw
in section 1.
The theory is as follows:
(39) Theory the First
VP-ellipsis and NP-deletion consist in the generation of bare VP and
NP nodes, respectively. These structures are sent to PF. There is an LF
process of resolving the ellipsis, whereby the bare nodes are replaced
with a copy of a phrase of the same syntactic category drawn from the









Figure 2: Bill does too
According to this account, then, a sentence involving VP-ellipsis or NP-deletion
begins life as a structure that is syntactically incomplete. For example, the last
sentence of (40) will have the (possibly simpliﬁed) structure in Figure 2.
(40) John loves Mary and Bill does too.
Note that in Figure 2 we have a VP node that is simply not spelled out any
further. This will be possible if we adhere to a traditional conception of phrase
structure rules that allows things like (41).
(41) v  → vV P
It is obviously incompatible with Chomsky’s (1995) Bare Phrase Structure, ac-
cording to which the idea of a phrasal node with no daughters does not make
sense. I hope to show that signiﬁcant empirical advantages can be gained from
the traditional conception of syntactic rules.
We generate, then, a structure like that in Figure 2, and this is what is pro-
nounced. Ellipsis resolution will then be an LF process that replaces the bare
phrasal node with a copy of a phrase of the same syntactic category drawn from
the linguistic environment.5 In the case of the current example, then, we copy
the antecedent VP [VP love Mary] and replace the empty VP node with it.
5We will need to make an addition to our theory when we return to the consideration ofThe Semantics of Ellipsis 77
Before we go on to look at how this conception of ellipsis facilitates the
analysis of ellipsis-containing antecedents and binderless sloppy readings, there
are a couple of potential problems to address. First, we should pause to consider
the case of simple bound variables in VP-ellipsis. Consider (42).
(42) Every woman loves her mother. Even Mary does.
According to almost all current theories, her in the ﬁrst sentence of this example
is to be analyzed as being or containing a bound individual variable.6 I too will
assume this. The current theory, then, must maintain that we start off with the
LF structure in (43).
(43) Every woman λ2 Tt 2 v love her2 mother. Even THE Mary λ2 does t2 v
VP.
The process of LF ellipsis resolution produces the following:
(44) Every woman λ2 Tt 2 v love her2 mother. Even THE Mary λ2 does t2 v
love her2 mother.
This produces the right reading, of course. And the use of the same index on the
expressions bound by the subjects of the ﬁrst and second sentences violates no
prohibition that I know of. Difﬁculties with repeated use of the same index only
arise if the same index is used on referential expressions with different intended
referents, or on bound variables intended to be bound by different operators that
lie within the scope of both (unlike in this case), or on both bound variables
and an independent referential expression. Heim and Kratzer (1998:254) have
proposed a principle explicitly to deal with the latter case.
ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent in section 2.5. Meanwhile, if the idea of replacing a node
with something else causes unease, one could also think of ellipsis resolution as copying the
daughters of a node of the same category in the linguistic environment and pasting them sepa-
rately into position beneath the ellipsis node. But I personally ﬁnd the version in the text less
awkward.
6An exception is the variable-free semantics proposed by Szabolcsi (1989) and explored by
Jacobson (1999, 2000) in connection with Categorial Grammar. I will not attempt to assess this
work here. See Elbourne forthcoming for some critical discussion.78 Paul Elbourne
The second matter that a simple copying theory of ellipsis, like the present
one, must address, is what Fiengo and May (1994: 218) call vehicle change.
The question is to deal with examples like the following:
(45) I turned in my assignment, but most of the other students didn’t.
The problem, of course, is that a straightforward theory of copying (or, indeed,
of deletion under identity) seems to predict that the last sentence here will only
be able to mean “most of the other students didn’t turn in my assignment,”
when in fact it can mean that most of the other students did not turn in their
assignment. This need not be seen as ruling out the current approach, however.
One theory that has been proposed is to see pronouns like my here as simple
bound variables semantically devoid of φ-features, their φ-features being inher-
ited from their binders by an agreement process at PF (Kratzer 1998, Rullmann
2004, Heim 2005), and for present purposes I will assume that something like








It can be seen that with the theory of ellipsis just sketched, the problem is
resolved quite easily. We start out with a simpliﬁed LF representation like that
in (47) for the utterance in question.
(47) when John had to cook, he did not want to v VP
when he had to clean, he did not v VPThe Semantics of Ellipsis 79
There are bare VP nodes here, and we have a choice which one we ﬁll in ﬁrst.
Suppose we take the second and replace it with a copy of the matrix VP in the
ﬁrst sentence. We obtain the following:
(48) when John had to cook, he did not want to v VP
when he had to clean, he did not v want to v VP
We can then ﬁll in the resultant bare VP nodes with simple VPs drawn from the
respective preceding sentences:
(49) when John had to cook, he did not want to v cook
when he had to clean, he did not v want to v clean
The right meaning results. The other cases of ellipsis-containing antecedents,
(13)–(15), will work analogously.
We might very well wonder if this system overgenerates. The simple answer
is that it does indeed, if we suppose it not to be supplemented with other con-
siderations. For example, the theory as it stands predicts that the following will
also be a possible LF structure for (46):
(50) when John had to cook, he did not want to v clean
when he had to clean, he did not v want to v cook
There is nothing in Theory the First to prevent us reaching the stage shown in
(48) and then looking forward to the second sentence and ﬁlling in the ellipsis
in the ﬁrst with the VP clean, and looking back to the ﬁrst sentence and under-
standing cook in the ﬁnal ellipsis site. But I take it that these ellipsis resolutions
will be ruled out by independent factors. After all, the syntactic structure in (48)
is exactly that which we see overtly spelled out in (51):
(51) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to. When he had to clean, he
didn’t want to either.
And it is a fact that this example cannot be understood as in (50) either. I take
it then that Theory the First is correct as far as it goes, but that it must be sup-80 Paul Elbourne
plemented with other considerations, perhaps having to do with processing, that
restrict the VPs that can be used as antecedents. Perhaps distance from the el-
lipsis site is one heuristic: if we consider (48) as a linear string, we see that the
VP clean is six VPs back from the ellipsis site for which it is being considered
as a possible antecedent.
2.3 Binderless Sloppy Readings
I will now consider how we should deal with cases of binderless sloppy read-
ings. Let us reconsider (10), repeated here as (52):
(52) If John has trouble at school, I’ll help him, but if Bill does, I won’t.
Recall that this example can mean, “...ifBill has trouble at school I won’t help
Bill.”
Given the analysis of pronouns as deﬁnite articles and names as predi-
cates outlined in section 2.1.2, this case in fact reduces to the last one. Binder-
less sloppy readings, in other words, are also cases of ellipsis-containing an-
tecedents. The initial (slightly simpliﬁed) structure of the current example is the
following:
(53) if THE J o h nTvh a v etrouble at school, I will v help him NP
if THE Bill does v VP, I will not v VP
Note that it makes sense under the current conception of pronouns to say that
there is NP-deletion after him, since him is a determiner. (It would differ from
the normal deﬁnite article the in allowing NP-deletion after it.) Hence the bare
NP node following him in (53). The resolution of the ﬁrst VP-ellipsis is straight-
forward:
(54) if THE J o h nTvh a v etrouble at school, I will v help him NP
if THE Bill does v have trouble at school, I will not v VPThe Semantics of Ellipsis 81
We now replace the remaining bare VP node with a copy of the matrix VP of
the ﬁrst sentence:
(55) if THE J o h nTvh a v etrouble at school, I will v help him NP
if THE Bill does v have trouble at school, I will not v help him NP
And we resolve the two instances of NP-deletion in the most straightforward
way by taking antecedents in the respective sentences of the bare NP nodes:
(56) if THE J o h nTvh a v etrouble at school, I will v help him John
if THE Bill does v have trouble at school, I will not v help him Bill
Again, the correct meaning is obtained. The other examples of binderless sloppy
readings will work analogously.
2.4 Split Antecedents
Recall the examples of split antecedents in (16)–(18), repeated here as (57)–
(59).
(57) BobwantstosailroundtheworldandAlicewantstoclimbKilimanjaro,
but neither of them can, because money is too tight.
(58) I did everything Mary did. Mary swam the English Channel and Mary
climbed Kilimanjaro, and I did too.
(59) Whenever Max uses the fax or Oscar uses the Xerox, I can’t.
(57) seems to be interpreted something like “...neither of them can do what
they want to do.” (58) means “...I swam the English Channel and climbed
Kilimanjaro too.” And (59) seems to mean “...Icannot use whichever machine
is being used.”
Given that these interpretations do not appear to have very close syntactic
links to any antecedent Verb Phrases, it is tempting at this point to say that we
have been on the wrong track all along, and that the interpretation of an elided82 Paul Elbourne
VP can be any property of events that the hearer might reasonably be expected
to work out. But this would be going too far. Consider (60), which is taken from
Heim 1996.
(60) The garbage can is full. *I hope that you will, for a change.
It is obvious here that the speaker means “I hope that you will take out the
garbage.” But despite the fact that it is easy to work out the intended meaning,
this example does not work as a VP-ellipsis. There must be a tighter connection
with some previous VP.
One rarely considered option that might nevertheless be explored at this
stage is to say that the elided VP can be interpreted as any property of events
that has some syntactic connection with an antecedent VP. For example, we can
interpret (57) as “...neither of them can do what they want to do” because we
have the word want in a preceding VP. On this theory, (60) would not felici-
tous because no plausible VP meaning can be reconstructed that would use any
functions contributed by any word in the antecedent VP is full. In particular,
neither of these words contributes anything from which the meaning “take out
the garbage” can be constructed. This is too unimaginative, though. If we are
allowed to create “...neither of them can do what they want to do” solely on the
basis of the word want and a shrewd idea of what the speaker might be driving
at, then surely we could construct “make the garbage can not be full any more”
from the word full and the same kind of shrewd idea. But, to repeat, (60) does
not seem to be a successful VP-ellipsis, no matter what precise way we think of
understanding it.
I conclude that in these cases, then, we still have a very close connection
to the antecedents. In particular, I assume that reference must be made to the
exact form of the antecedent VPs, as in Theory the First.7 As a ﬁrst step, let us
reexamine the examples and see if we can come up with paraphrases that seem
7We will return to the cases of ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent in section 2.5.The Semantics of Ellipsis 83
to incorporate the exact meanings of the antecedents. My proposal is that our
examples are to be paraphrased as in the (b) sentences below, where the phrases
in italics hark back to the antecedent VP denotations.
(61) a. Bob wants to sail round the world and Alice wants to climb Kili-
manjaro, but neither of them can, because money is too tight.
b. Bob wants to sail round the world and Alice wants to climb Kil-
imanjaro, but neither of them can perform the particular action or
actions out of sailing round the world and climbing Kilimanjaro
that they desire.
(62) a. I did everything Mary did. Mary swam the English Channel and
Mary climbed Kilimanjaro, and I did too.
b. Mary swam the English Channel and Mary climbed Kilimanjaro
and I performed the particular action or actions out of swimming the
English Channel and climbing Kilimanjaro that Mary performed.
(63) a. Whenever Max uses the fax or Oscar uses the Xerox, I can’t.
b. WheneverMaxusesthefaxorOscarusestheXerox,Ican’tperform
the particular action or actions out of using the fax and using the
Xerox that are being performed.
Itcanbe seenthatoneformofparaphrase coversalltheexamples.Informally,in
place of the elided VP we understand “perform the particular action or actions
out of f1 and f2 that have property F,” for VP meanings f1 and f2 and properties
of VP meanings F.
I propose to spell out parts of the above paraphrase schema with LF oper-
ators. For example, the LF of the ﬁnal sentence of (62a) will be that shown in
Figure 3. There is a special set of lexical items with the following semantics:
(64) For all n>0, [[ANDn]] g = λf1, s,t  ...f n, s,t .λh s,t .h ≤i f1 ⊕ ...⊕ fn
ThenotationisthatofLink’s(1983)theoryofplurality.AnoperatorANDn takes













swim the English Channel
VP
climb Kilimanjaro
Figure 3: I did too...
of  s,t  functions that are part of the plural individual that has all and only the n
arguments as atomic parts. In the present case, we have the following:
(65) [[AND2]] g = λf1, s,t .λf2, s,t .λh s,t .h ≤i f1 ⊕ f2
This means that the denotation of AND0P in the syntax is as in (66). I use the
two italicized phrases to stand for the meanings of the two VPs.
(66) λh s,t .h ≤i swimming ⊕ climbing
The point of THE and its argument R1, st,t  is to introduce the modiﬁcation of
the VP-meanings that we have seen to be necessary in some of the paraphrases
in (61)–(63). In the present case, as it happens, this item is redundant, but I will
show the argument R1, st,t  in action for the sake of illustration. (It will play aThe Semantics of Ellipsis 85
central role in analysis of (61a) and (63a); it so happens that (62a) is simple
in ways that make it a good introductory example.) Let us assume, then, that
R1, st,t  is assigned the value shown in (67):
(67) [[R1, st,t ]] g = λf s,t .∃e(f(e)=1&Agent(e,Mary))
This function is not the value of any overt linguistic constituent, but we can
assume that this does not matter for LF variables. The mention of Mary doing
things makes this function salient enough.
Meanwhile, the operator THE has the denotation in (68), which uses some
terminology from Link 1983 deﬁned in (69); ∗P is the plural predicate, the
one that characterizes both singular entities that are P and plural entities whose
atomic parts are all P.
(68) [[THE]] g = λF st,t .λG st,t .σf(F(f)=1&G(f)=1 )
(69) σxPx := ιx(∗Px& ∀y(∗Py→ y ≤i x))
In other words, THE takes as its arguments two properties of VP-meanings and
maps them to the maximal plural individual composed of individuals that satisfy
the two arguments. (I use individual here not to mean an entity of type e but to
mean an atom within the relevant domain, which is here D s,t .)
Given these deﬁnitions, the denotation of THEP in Figure 3 is (70a), which
in the present context is equivalent to (70b).
(70) a. σf(∃e(f(e)=1&Agent(e,Mary)) & f ≤i swimming⊕climbing)
b. swimming ⊕ climbing
Moving upwards in Figure 3, we come to v and Tpast, whose denotations we
wrote in (36) as follows:
(71) [[Tpast]] g = λf s,t .∃t(t<NOW & at t : ∃ef(e)=1 )
[[v]] g = λf s,t .λy.λe.f(e)=1&Agent(e,y)
These lexical entries will still sufﬁce, but we now have to be sure to understand
the notion of Agent in such a way that one can be an Agent of plural events. Let86 Paul Elbourne
us say that one is an Agent of a plural event if and only if one is an Agent, in
the normal sense, of all the events that are atomic parts of it. We will also need
to make sense of the notion of an event (a plural event, to be sure) satisfying a
plural individual made up of VP-meanings. Let us say that for any event e and
functions f,g of type  s,t , f ⊕ g(e)=1if and only if there exist events e  and
e   such that f(e )=1and g(e  )=1and e  ≤i e and e   ≤i e.
Assuming the speaker is John, we ﬁnally arrive at the truth conditions in
(72) for the whole sentence:
(72) ∃t(t<NOW & at t : ∃e(swimming ⊕ climbing(e)=1&
Agent(e,John)))
Inotherwords,therewasinthepastapluraleventesuchthatehadasitspartsan
event of swimming the English Channel and an event of climbing Kilimanjaro
and John was the agent of e, in the new sense whereby he was the agent of every
atomic part of e. These truth conditions seem to be intuitively adequate.
I will shortly go on to analyze (61a) (the sentence about the globe-trotting
desires of Bob and Alice), but before doing so I should perhaps be more explicit
about the new syntax of VP-ellipsis than I have been so far. The proposal is that
a vP can be spelled out by the rules and rule-schemas in (73):
(73) vP → vT HEP
THEP → THE  AND0P
ANDnP → ANDn+1PV P
ANDnP → ANDn+1 VP
THE  → THE RP
RP → Rm, st,t 
RP → Rm, e,stt  prol,e
I am not aware of any cases where the RP has to contain more than one variable
of type e, so I have just listed two cases above; a more sophisticated treatment















sail round the world
VP
climb Kilimanjaro
Figure 4: Neither of them can...
Let us move on to the analysis of (61a), repeated here as (74).
(74) BobwantstosailroundtheworldandAlicewantstoclimbKilimanjaro,
but neither of them can, because money is too tight.
The LF for neither of them can will be that shown in Figure 4. The free variable
R1, e,stt  will be assigned a meaning as follows:
(75) [[R1, e,stt ]] g =λx.λf s,t .xdesiresthattherebeaneventesuchthatf(e)=
1 and Agent(e,x))
I will avail myself of the following simple denotations for can and neither of
them:
(76) [[can]] g = λf s,t .it is possible that there be an event e such that f(e)=1
[[neither of them]] g = λf e,t .¬∃x((x = Bob ∨ x = Alice)&f(x)=1 )88 Paul Elbourne
Given these denotations, the truth conditions for this example come out to be as
in (77). I use italicized expressions to abbreviate meanings of the VPs.
(77) ¬∃x((x = Bob ∨ x = Alice) and it is possible that there be an event e 
such that σf(x desires that there be an event e such that f(e)=1and
Agent(e,x) and f ≤i sailing ⊕ climbing)(e ) = 1 and Agent(e ,x))
In other words, there does not exist an individual x such that x is Bob or Alice
anditispossiblethatxbetheagentofaneventthatsatisﬁestheuniquepredicate
f such that x wants to be the agent of an f-event and f is one of sailing round
the world and climbing Kilimanjaro. This seems to be intuitively adequate.8
(63a), repeated here as (78a), will work by the same means, as suggested by
the paraphrase in (78b).
(78) a. Whenever Max uses the fax or Oscar uses the Xerox, I can’t.
b. WheneverMaxusesthefaxorOscarusestheXerox,Ican’tperform
the particular action or actions out of using the fax and using the
Xerox that are being performed.
In other words, there will be two small VPs using the fax and using the Xerox,
and an R variable will be assigned a denotation something like “currently being
performed.” Working out an exact analysis would require us to make decisions
regarding what entities whenever quantiﬁes over (time intervals? situations?)
and whether these are represented in the syntax. The general outlines are clear,
8The idea of having the variable R1, e,stt  provide extra descriptive material to modify syn-
tactically more robust material is reminiscent of the approach to quantiﬁer domain restriction
that posits variables in the syntax, as proposed by von Fintel 1994, Stanley 2000 and Stanley
and Szab´ o 2000. In particular, von Fintel (1994) sometimes has two variables in such positions,
one an individual variable bound by the subject, in order to deal with sentences like Only one
class was so bad that no student passed, where we are to understand “only one class x...no
student in x....” The combination of a deﬁnite article plus a relation variable plus an individual
variable is also reminiscent of the LF conﬁguration posited by Heim and Kratzer (1998) to spell
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however.9
There are also examples of split antecedents involving NP-deletion, as we
saw in (19), repeated here as (79). I will analyze the variant in (80), which is
more revealing of structure since the quantiﬁer each actually seems to bind into
the NP-deletion site.
(79) John needs a hammer. Mary needs a mallet. They’re going to borrow
Bill’s.
(80) John needed a hammer. Mary needed a mallet. Each borrowed Bill’s.
We will need a set of rules for spelling out silent NPs parallel to the ones we
saw for VPs in (73). The rules and rule-schemas in (81) will sufﬁce.
(81) DP → D THEP
THEP → THE  AND0P
ANDnP → ANDn+1PN P
ANDnP → ANDn+1 NP
THE  → THE SP
SP → Sm, et,t 
SP → Sm, e,ett  prol,e
Translating the proposal just explored with respect to VP-ellipsis into the NP
domain, we arrive, then, at the slightly simpliﬁed LF in Figure 5 for the last
sentence of (80). I ignore any complexity there may be behind the surface forms
each and Bill’s. The new operators THE and AND2 will receive the interpreta-
tions in (82) and (83), parallel to the interpretations of THE and AND2.
(82) [[THE]] g = λF et,t .λG et,t .σf(F(f)=1&G(f)=1 )
9The present apparatus can also be put into service to analyze cases of overt conjunction
of VPs, as in John walked and sang. All that is needed is for the overt and in this position to
mean λf s,t .λg s,t .f ⊕ g. There are arguably conceptual advantages to having and produce a
sum of entities when it appears between VPs, just as it does when it conjoins expressions of
type e. See Krifka 1990 and Lasersohn 1995 for detailed proposals concerning the non-boolean






















Figure 5: Each borrowed Bill’s
(83) [[AND2]] g = λf e,t .λg e,t .λh e,t .h ≤i f ⊕ g
The nouns hammer and mallet receive the denotations one might expect, and the
free variable S1, e,ett  will receive the following interpretation from the variable
assignment g:
(84) [[S1, e,ett ]] g = λx.λf e,t .xneeds an f
(85) [[hammer]] g = λx.x is a hammer
(86) [[mallet]] g = λx.x is a malletThe Semantics of Ellipsis 91
I abstract away from the complexities inherent in the analysis of transitive in-
tensional verbs like need. Allowing ourselves the convenient lexical entries in
(87), (88) and (89) for each, Bill’s and borrow, we arrive at the truth conditions
in (90) for the last sentence of (80). I use italicized words to abbreviate the
meanings of hammer and mallet.
(87) [[each]] g = λf e,t .∀x((x = John ∨ x = Mary) → f(x)=1 )
(88) [[Bill’s]] g = λf e,t .ιx(x is Bill’s & f(x)=1 )
(89) [[borrow]] g = λx.λe.borrowing(e)&Theme(e,x)
(90) ∀x((x = John ∨ x = Mary) →∃ t(t<NOW & at t : ∃e(borrowing(e)
& Agent(e,x)&Theme(e,ιy(y is Bill’s & σf(x needs an f & f ≤i
hammer ⊕ mallet)(y) = 1)))))
The claim, then, is that the last sentence of (80) is true if and only if, for all x
such that x is Mary or John, x was the Agent of a borrowing event whose Theme
was the unique item of Bill’s that satisﬁed the unique predicate f such that x
needed an f and f was one of hammer and mallet. This seems to be accurate.
It is time to consider how to integrate the model that we have built up for
split antecedent cases with the theory that we developed in previous sections for
binderless sloppy readings and ellipsis-containing antecedents. Recall Theory
the First in (39), repeated here as (91):
(91) Theory the First
VP-ellipsis and NP-deletion consist in the generation of bare VP and
NP nodes, respectively. These structures are sent to PF. There is an LF
process of resolving the ellipsis, whereby the bare nodes are replaced
with a copy of a phrase of the same syntactic category drawn from the
linguistic environment.
We can combine this theory with the procedures we have posited to deal with
the split antecedent cases by adopting the following statement:92 Paul Elbourne
(92) Theory the Second
(i) VP and NP nodes may be bare.
(ii) vPs may be spelled out as in (73).
(iii) DPs may be spelled out as in (81).
(iv) VPs and NPs in AND0Ps and AND0Ps must be bare.
(v) A bare VP or NP node must be replaced at LF by a copy of a
phrase of the same syntactic category drawn from the linguistic
environment.
In other words we view the trees in Figures 3–5 not as being base-generated
but as deriving from structures that originally had bare VPs and NP nodes in
their AND0Ps and AND0Ps. All else proceeds as previously described, and we
still retain the option of handling the ellipsis-containing antecedent cases and
binderless sloppy readings with the simpler structures posited earlier.10
Before we leave these data, we should note that it is also possible to concoct
labored but not ungrammatical examples that combine the traits of the various
species that we have been examining. (93), for example, is a combination of a
split antecedent case and a case of an ellipsis-containing antecedent:
10An alternative way of unifying Theory the First with the structures posited for split an-
tecedent cases would maintain that VP-ellipsis and NP-deletion always involve deﬁnite de-
scription structures of the type posited in (73) and (81). In cases without split antecedents we
would just have one VP or NP as part of the structure, and the operator AND1 or AND1.I fw e
suppose that some trivial property is generally available for the denotation of RP and SP when
these phrases are redundant, it turns out that a deﬁnite description structure with just one NP or
VP is semantically equivalent to just having the NP or VP there by itself. I marginally prefer
the option given in the text because of the complexity of the structures that result in cases of
ellipsis-containing antecedents if we suppose that we always have deﬁnite descriptions in ellip-
sis. But the issue is a subtle one, and the theory described in this note has a certain kind of unity
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(93) When Bob had to sail round the world and Mary had to climb Kili-
manjaro, they didn’t want to; and when Bob had to swim the English
Channel and Mary had to climb K2 they didn’t, either.
It is simple to derive this example in the current theory: the overt want to is
followed by a little v and a silent THEP containing two bare VP nodes, and
before these VP nodes are ﬁlled in this structure is copied and used to resolve
the VP-ellipsis in the second sentence. There are then two separate processes of
resolving split antecedent ellipsis, one in each sentence.
2.5 Ellipsis with No Linguistic Antecedent
Recall the cases of ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent in (22)–(33), some of
which are repeated in (94)–(98).
(94) (John attempts to kiss Mary while driving.)
John, you mustn’t.
(95) (A piece of chocolate cake is offered.)
I really shouldn’t.
(96) (As an invitation to dance.)
Shall we?
(97) (Mary gets John an expensive present.)
Mary, you shouldn’t have!
(98) (There are lots of barking dogs in the yard. We look at them without
speaking. I point and say:)
Harry’s is particularly noisy.
The question is how to integrate these cases into the framework developed in
section 2.4.
Roughlyspeaking,whattheexamplesofellipsiswithnolinguisticantecedent
have in common is that there is some obvious sensory (in these cases visual)94 Paul Elbourne
clue to the property conveyed by the unpronounced phrase. The clue need not
always be an instance of the relevant action or entity before the very eyes of the
speaker and hearer: there is kissing in the scenario of (94) and a dog in that of
(98), but not necessarily any eating in that of (95), and certainly not any eating
of the piece of cake being offered; and there may or may not be dancing actually
taking place when (96) is uttered, provided that it is clear to speaker and hearer
that they are at a dance. But in the cases of VP-ellipsis there must at least be
an obvious result of the action in question or a stimulus towards performing it.
It is hard to be more precise, and I will leave the matter here for now, pending
further research.
I propose that in these cases too we have full syntactic VPs and NPs at LF.11
So in (94), for example, we might have something like [VP kiss me now]. We
can now emend our theory to the following, which is the ﬁnal version:
(99) Theory the Third
(i) VP and NP nodes may be bare.
(ii) vPs may be spelled out as in (73).
(iii) DPs may be spelled out as in (81).
(iv) VPs and NPs in AND0Ps and AND0Ps must be bare.
(v) A bare VP or NP node must be ﬁlled in at LF by a VP or NP that
is highly salient.
(v) A VP or NP is highly salient if and only if:
11One sometimes gets the impression that some theorists think that verb-phrase meanings
that are merely contextually salient or able to be worked out, as opposed to occurring as the
value of some constituent in the linguistic environment, should not come to be represented as
syntactically fully-ﬂedged VPs. It is unclear what the grounds for this view could be, however.
If it ever happens that we think of things and then put our thoughts into words, which is not
implausible, we are extraordinarily adept at moving from non-linguistic to linguistic modes of
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(a) its denotation describes an action or thing made salient by an
obvious sensory clue; or
(b) it is a copy of a phrase of the same syntactic category drawn
from the linguistic environment.
This theory should be seen as part of general linguistic competence, but it will
be used by speakers and hearers in different ways. The hearer, whose job it is
to try to work out what the speaker was saying, might not arrive at the precise
unpronounced LF phrase that is present in the mind of the speaker, especially
in cases where there is no linguistic antecedent; but communication will have
proceeded well enough if the speaker comes up with something with the same
or a relevantly similar meaning. See Neale 2005 for salutary discussion of the
asymmetric roles of speaker and hearer.
Before leaving the current theory, there are two loose ends that should be
tied up. Firstly, the theory of ellipsis outlined here is naturally one way of
spelling out some details left obscure in my previous work (Elbourne 2001,
forthcoming) in which I claimed that E-type anaphora was NP-deletion; but this
latter thesis is independent of any particular analysis of NP-deletion.
Secondly, we should revisit example (60), repeated here as (100), to make
sure that we do not end up predicting that it is good.
(100) The garbage can is full. *I hope that you will, for a change.
In the absence of a strong sensory clue of the kind exempliﬁed earlier, we have
to work with the antecedent VP is full. The example presumably fails because
there is no sufﬁciently salient relation R, a possible ﬁrst argument of THE, that
could combine with the meaning of this VP and give the desired interpretation.
Note that if a strong visual clue is offered, the example becomes better. If, for
example, I hand you the brimming garbage can and utter the last sentence of
(100), the sentence dramatically improves.96 Paul Elbourne
3 Previous Literature
In this section I brieﬂy compare the theory advocated in this article with some
other theories that try to cover some or all of the tricky cases dealt with here. I
will not attempt a detailed review of the literature on ellipsis, which would be a
mammoth undertaking.12
3.1 Rooth 1992
Rooth’s inﬂuential paper proposes using entailment-like relations involving fo-
cus to characterize the relationship between elided phrase and antecedent. He
claims that VP-ellipsis is permitted only if two conditions are met: ﬁrst, the lex-
ical content of the elided VP at LF must be the same as that of an antecedent
VP, modulo indices on pronouns and traces; and second, the elided VP must be
embedded in a constituent β such that there is a constituent α containing the
antecedent VP such that the ordinary semantic value of α is a member of the
set of focus alternatives generated by β. A variant of Rooth’s condition is to be
found in work by Merchant (2001).
Some of the details of Rooth’s theory are less than satisfactory, however. He
gives an analysis of binderless sloppy readings like (101) that crucially involves
the DP John scoping out of its containing DP. This already seem dubious, since
DP is normally an island. And we surely cannot extend this idea to (102) and
12Two theories worthy of note that I do not deal with in the main text are the higher order
uniﬁcation theory of Dalrymple, Shieber and Pereira (1991) and the discourse grammar theory
of Pr¨ ust, Scha and van den Berg (1994). The former deals with binderless sloppy readings and
might be extended to deal with (62a), the sentence about Mary swimming the English Channel
and climbing Kilimanjaro; but it does not attempt to deal with ellipsis-containing antecedents
and the other split antecedent cases, and I see no way of extending it so that it would. Pr¨ ust,
Scha and van den Berg (1994) also account for cases like (62a) but they do not attempt to deal
with the other split antecedent cases, the binderless sloppy readings or the ellipsis-containing
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(103), where the relevant DP would have to scope out of a relative clause or an
if-clause.
(101) John’s coach thinks he has a chance, and Bill’s coach does too.
(102) The policeman who arrested John read him his rights, but the policeman
who arrested Bill didn’t.
(103) If John has trouble at school, I’ll help him, but if Bill does, I won’t.
Rooth does not offer any analysis of ellipsis-containing antecedents or split an-
tecedents.
3.2 Fiengo and May 1994
Fiengo and May (1994) attempt to account for binderless sloppy readings (and
other data) by means of a complex system that exploits isomorphism of patterns
of indices in trees. I will not attempt to summarize this theory here.13
Fiengo and May also analyze split antecedent cases such as (104).
(104) I did everything that Mary did. Mary swam the English Channel, and
Mary climbed Kilimanjaro, and I did too.
About this example, they say the following (1994:195):
In this sentence, what is elided are occurrences of the VPs swim
the English Channel and climb Kilimanjaro (and an occurrence of
and). This is all we need to know to “recover” the ellipsis—that
13We should note, however, that Rooth already in his 1992, page 18, had published the fol-
lowing counterexample to Fiengo and May’s theory:
(i) Yesterday John’s boss told him to shape up, and today Bill’s boss did.
(ii) Yesterday the guy John works for told him to shape up, and today Bill’s boss did.
Since John and Bill do not occupy isomorphic positions in their respective sentences in (ii), it
is unclear that Fiengo and May’s account correctly predicts the sloppy reading here.98 Paul Elbourne
is, that the ﬁnal clause is I swam the English Channel and climbed
Kilimanjaro. That the elided occurrences must be conjoined in the
representation of ([104]) just follows from the way they can “ﬁt”
into its structure.
They further suggest the following (1994:200), referring to examples like (78a)
(“Whenever Max uses the fax or Oscar uses the Xerox...”):
As a general rule, the discourse sentence is also the domain from
which the elided coordinating element is drawn. In a case of dis-
junction, for instance, or is reconstructed.
It appears, then, that Fiengo and May are assuming that a conjunction must be
reconstructed somehow on the basis of the linguistic environment. A possible
problem with this theory is that there are split antecedent cases when there is no
and or or in the linguistic environment (Elbourne 2001):
(105) Mary swam the English Channel. Mary climbed Kilimanjaro. I did too.
It is unclear to me how (105) could be dealt with in Fiengo and May’s theory
of split antecedent cases. It poses no problem for the theory advocated in this
article, of course, since this theory does not rely on a conjunction being present
in the linguistic environment.
Fiengo and May do not deal with cases of ellipsis-containing antecedents.
3.3 Hardt 1999
As far as I know, Hardt’s (1999) theory is the only one previously published
that attempts to account for binderless sloppy readings, ellipsis-containing an-
tecedents and split antecedents. It is also not difﬁcult to see how it might be
extended to deal with cases of ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent. For the
purpose of illustration, I will give an informal summary of how Hardt analyzes
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Hardt uses a dynamic semantics incorporating a notion of discourse cen-
ter, based on the Centering framework of Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein 1995. In
particular, discourse representation structures (the “boxes” of traditional DRT
(Kamp 1981)) contain special discourse markers (variables) assigned to the cen-
ter (roughly, topic) of the discourse. This enables Hardt to explain binderless
sloppy readings along the following lines. Take (106).
(106) If Tom was having trouble in school, I would help him. If Harry was
having trouble, I wouldn’t.
In the ﬁrst sentence, the discourse center is Tom. The overt pronoun him is
translated by a special discourse marker assigned to the center. So help him
meanssomethinglike“helpthecurrentcenter.”Thismeaningisthenunderstood
at the ellipsis site; more precisely, it is the assigned as the value of the INFL of
the second sentence, which is a deictic element in this theory. In the meantime,
however, the center has changed. Harry is the discourse center of the second
sentence. So the second sentence ends up meaning “I wouldn’t help Harry,” as
desired.
The same principle can be used in cases of ellipsis-containing antecedents.
Take our standard example:
(107) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to. When he had to clean, he
didn’t either.
Hardt supposes that in the ﬁrst sentence the discourse center is the property of
cooking. The ﬁrst VP-ellipsis is resolved by having to be a deictic expression
that picks up the property that is the current center. We arrive at the meaning
“want to cook,” then, for the end of the ﬁrst sentence. The value of the deictic
INFL of the second sentence is taken to be the DRT representation of want
to, something interpretable as “want to perform the kind of action that is the
current center.” And again by the time we get to this point the center has shifted,100 Paul Elbourne
according to Hardt. It is now the property of cleaning, and the so the correct
interpretation is obtained.
Even from this informal summary, it can be seen that it is important to
Hardt’s system that there is no syntactic structure, or at least no syntactic com-
plexity, at ellipsis sites. The correct interpretation is arrived at by assigning de-
notations involving variables picking out the current center to the INFL of the
ellipsis sentence. (One could also imagine a variant in which there was a deictic
element in the VP position, as opposed to having INFL do this job.) But this
feature of the theory, which lends it a useful ﬂexibility and power, means that
it is ill-equipped to deal with cases where there seems to be movement from
ellipsis sites, as in the following examples.
(108) Which book did John read? And which book did Bill?
(109) John read every book that Bill did.
SeeJohnson2001forasummaryofthecontroversyonwhethertheorieswithout
normalsyntacticstructuresintheellipsissitescandealwithexampleslikethese.
The upshot is not encouraging for those theories, and things seem especially
difﬁcult for the particular version that Hardt puts forward, according to which
there is nothing whatsoever in ellipsis sites. By contrast, the theory advocated
in the current article has normal syntactic structure in all ellipsis sites.14
14Hardt’s theory also faces a knotty technical difﬁculty in analyzing certain seemingly simple
cases of sloppy identity. Take Tom loves his cat and John does too (Hardt 1999:194). Using the
device described above, Hardt analyzes loves his cat as roughly “loves the cat of the current
center,” and wants this meaning understood at the ellipsis site, by which time the center has
changed to John. But the actual DRT representation used to express this meaning by Hardt also,
necessarily given the system, contains a discourse marker for Tom’s cat. Roughly speaking,
and in slightly incongruous terms, we can think of his cat here as meaning something like
“the unique x such that x is the cat of the current center and x is identical to c,” where c is
a constant referring to Tom’s cat. If we understand this at the ellipsis site, then, we obtain a
contradiction: the claim would be that John loves the cat of the current center (himself) that is
identical to c (not his own, but Tom’s cat). To avoid this difﬁculty Hardt proposes to reconstruct
an “alphabetic variant” of the original property, one that replaces the troublesome discourse
marker referring to Tom’s cat by another one (Hardt 1999:195). But this seems like the merestThe Semantics of Ellipsis 101
3.4 Tomioka 1999
Tomioka 1999 analyzes binderless sloppy readings by proposing that the pro-
nouns in such cases are actually donkey pronouns. He follows Cooper (1979) in
supposing that donkey pronouns are interpreted as deﬁnite descriptions contain-
ing bound variables. So the overt read him his rights in (110) means something
like “read the person he arrested his rights,” with “he” bound by the subject.
(110) The policeman who arrested John read him his rights, but the policeman
who arrested Bill didn’t.
We understand the same meaning at the ellipsis site and the correct reading is
obtained.
We know, however, that the descriptive content of donkey pronouns can-
not be obtained so ﬂexibly, just by picking up contextually salient relations.
If it could, the following examples would have the same status (Heim 1990,
Elbourne 2001):
(111) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her.
b. ?? Every married man is sitting next to her.
In particular, (111b) would be fully felicitous, since her could mean “the person
he is married to.” This is not the case, however, meaning that the mechanism
relied on by Tomioka is problematic. There are also problems with the assump-
tion that donkey pronouns can contain bound individual variables. See Elbourne
2001 for further discussion.
Tomioka (1999) does not discuss ellipsis-containing antecedents or split an-
tecedents.
stipulation. Alphabetic variants are not equivalent in dynamic systems, unlike in traditional
logics. It matters whether we say, for example, ∃xPx or ∃yPy, since the former but not the
latter will be able to bind a syntactically free variable x that occurs in a later formula. As far
as I can see, then, it is not only stipulative but actually illegal to solve the current problem by
relying on the notion of alphabetic variance.102 Paul Elbourne
3.5 Schwarz 2000
Schwarz (2000, Chapter 5) analyzes cases of ellipsis-containing antecedents
that involve VP-ellipsis within VP-ellipsis by having the VPs scope out and
bind variables in both their overt positions and the ellipsis sites. So (112) has
the LF in (113).
(112) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to. When he had to clean, he
didn’t either.
(113) [cook] λQ[when John had to Q he didn’t want to Q]
[clean] λQ[when he had to Q he didn’t want to Q]
It can be seen that the correct interpretation would result, and the antecedent
and elided VPs are now identical. But surely we should assume, unless forced
todootherwise,thatLFmovementofVPsrespectswhatweknowaboutislands.
Phrases cannot, of course, generally move out of when-clauses. The theory ad-
vocated in the current article does not posit any abnormal movement.
Schwaz (2000) does not attempt to analyze binderless sloppy readings or
split antecedents.
4 Conclusion
I will refrain from summarizing my theory in this section, since I have done
so already in (99). I will merely note two possible extensions of it that could
proﬁtably be explored in future research. The question at issue concerns to what
extent the new deﬁnite description structure for VPs and NPs, which I have cau-
tiously posited so far only in split antecedent cases of ellipsis, should extended
to other syntactic categories and other kinds of occasion.
First, since I have concentrated on VP-ellipsis and NP-deletion in this arti-
cle, we should ask whether the LF apparatus introduced here has counterparts
in other kinds of ellipsis too, such as pseudo-gapping and sluicing. The answerThe Semantics of Ellipsis 103
presumably depends on whether other kinds of ellipsis display split antecedent
effects, since it was these cases that necessitated the new structures for NPs and
VPs in the current theory. A possible indicator in the case of sluicing is (114):
(114) Either John called someone or Mary called someone, but I don’t know
who.
This seems to have a reading “...butIdon’t know who was called by whichever
one of them it was.” This split antecedent interpretation constitutes evidence for
extending the present theory at least to sluicing.
Second, we should ask whether some pronounced VPs and NPs might have
the kind of deﬁnite description structure posited in this article. Evidence that
this might be so comes from the so-called “respectively” readings of sentences
like (115).
(115) You and I did everything that Mary and Jane did. Mary swam the En-
glish Channel, and Jane climbed Kilimanjaro, and you and I swam the
English Channel and climbed Kilimanjaro too.
Fiengo and May (1994:197) point out this sentence has a reading “You and
I swam the English Channel and climbed Kilimanjaro respectively.” In other
words, we get the split antecedent interpretation without ellipsis in cases like
this. Reverting to our former schema, we might paraphrase it “You and I per-
formed the action or actions out of swimming the English Channel and climbing
Kilimanjaro that were done by the person we were imitating.” This is strong ev-
idence for elements of the VP structure posited in this article being present in a
pronounced VP.104 Paul Elbourne
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